Through the Quantum Computing Lens: The FCC Council on National Security

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has recently established the Council on National Security, announced on March 13, 2025, under the leadership of new FCC Chairman Brendan Carr. The new Council is chartered to address escalating cyber threats and technological competition, with a specific focus on foreign adversaries, notably China.

When viewed through the lens of quantum computing, the Council’s mission takes on added significance owing to quantum technology’s dual role as both a national security asset and a potential threat to existing cryptographic systems. Here’s a detailed exploration of the FCC’s NSC.

Overview of the FCC’s Council on National Security

• Context: The Council arises amid heightened U.S.-China tensions, exemplified by China’s Salt Typhoon recent cyber espionage campaign targeting U.S. telecoms and Beijing’s ongoing push for quantum technology in its 2025 plans.
• Formation and Leadership: The Council was launched to consolidate the FCC’s efforts against foreign threats to U.S. telecommunications and technology sectors. It is directed by Adam Chan, a former lawyer with the House of Representatives’ China committee, and includes representatives from eight FCC bureaus and offices for cross-agency collaboration.
• Three-Part Agenda:
  1. Reduce U.S. tech and telecom sectors’ reliance on foreign adversaries’ supply chains.
  2. Mitigate vulnerabilities to cyberattacks, espionage, and surveillance from hostile states.
  3. Ensure U.S. dominance over China in critical technologies, explicitly including quantum computing alongside AI, 6G, satellites, and autonomous systems.

Quantum Computing’s Relevance to the Council

Quantum computing is explicitly named as a "critical technology" in the Council’s third objective, reflecting its growing importance to national security and its implications for telecommunications, a core FCC domain. Here’s how it fits:

1. Threat to Cybersecurity

• Quantum Decryption Risk: Quantum computers, once sufficiently advanced (i.e., reaching "Q-day"), may break widely used cryptographic systems. RSA and ECC are at risk if quantum computers develop to the extent of efficiently solving problems such as integer factorization and discrete logarithms. This threatens the security of telecom networks, financial transactions, and government communications—areas the FCC regulates or influences.
• Salt Typhoon Connection: The Council’s focus on mitigating cyberattacks aligns with concerns adversaries (China, etal.) could use quantum capabilities to exploit telecom vulnerabilities. While quantum computers are not yet capable of breaking encryption (projected to be so by the 2030s), the Council’s proactive stance suggests preparation for a nearer-term threat, especially given China’s heavy quantum investments. [It is worth explicitly mentioning that expert opinions vary widely on the timeline to breaking encryption. Some believe quantum threats could materialize sooner or later. Further, NIST is already pushing PQC precisely because timelines remain uncertain.]

2. Supply Chain and Tech Dominance

• Quantum Hardware: China’s dominance in technology manufacturing poses risks to U.S. quantum development. The Council’s goal to reduce reliance on foreign supply chains includes quantum computing components (e.g., semiconductors, rare earth metals).
• Competitive Edge: Ensuring U.S. leadership in quantum computing is vital as China accelerates its quantum efforts—evidenced by advances of the DeepSeek AI model and quantum technology priorities in its. The FCC’s role here is to secure our telecom infrastructure. This could be accomplished through the integration of quantum key distribution (QKD) and other quantum networking advancements offering theoretically unbreakable encryption.

3. Telecom Integration

• Quantum Networks: The FCC oversees communication spectrum allocation and telecom standards, areas where quantum communication (e.g., QKD over fiber or satellite) could overhaul secure data transfer. The Council’s third objective positions the FCC to shape standards for quantum-enabled 6G or beyond, countering China’s parallel efforts.
• Vulnerability Mitigation: Protecting against quantum-driven cyber threats requires upgrading telecom encryption to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), a process the Council could accelerate by coordinating with industry and government partners.

Quantum Computing Lens: Implications and Actions

• Strategic Priority: Naming quantum computing explicitly signals its centrality to U.S.-China technology rivalries. Unlike AI or 5G, quantum’s long-term disruptive potential (e.g., breaking encryption in minutes versus millennia with classical systems) makes it a national security wildcard. The Council’s formation reflects urgency, as China’s $15+ billion quantum investment dwarfs U.S. public funding.
• Preemptive Defense: The Council’s second goal, mitigating cyberattacks, ties directly to quantum risks. NIST’s new PQC standards are a start, but telecom adoption lags. The FCC could push carriers to adopt quantum-resistant algorithms, a move urged by expert Gregory Allen of the CSIS, who warns the U.S. lead over China is narrowing to “a year or two”.
• Innovation vs. Security: Balancing quantum advancement (objective 3) with protection (objective 2) is unwieldy. The Council must foster U.S. quantum telecom innovations while guarding against espionage, a concern heightened by China-Russia quantum cooperation.

Critical Examination

• Strengths:
  • The Council’s holistic approach, spanning supply chains, cyber defense, and tech leadership, positions the FCC as a key component in U.S. quantum security, beyond its traditional regulatory role.
  • Adam Chan’s China expertise suggests a targeted focus on Beijing’s quantum ambitions, aligning with broader U.S. policy.
• Weaknesses:
  • Scope Creep: The FCC’s mandate is telecom-focused, yet quantum computing spans broader domains (military, energy, etc.). Without tight coordination across government agencies (e.g., National Quantum Coordination Office), the Council risks overlap or gaps.
  • Timing: Quantum threats are still theoretical for most systems. Critics on social media have labelled the threats as “premature posturing,” arguing resources should target immediate cyber threats similar to Salt Typhoon vice the still speculative quantum threat. Our stance is that quantum threat preparedness should complement, not detract from, immediate cyber defenses.
• China Narrative: The Council’s China-centric framing may oversimplify a global quantum race involving Europe, Japan, and others, potentially missing wider threats or beneficial collaboration.

Final Thoughts

Through a quantum computing lens, the FCC Council on National Security, launched March 13, 2025, is a positive strategic move to safeguard U.S. telecoms against future quantum threats while securing technological primacy over China. The Council addresses quantum’s dual nature: Its potential to transfigure secure communications and its risk to current encryption—by tackling supply chains, cyber vulnerabilities, and innovation. Its success hinges on execution: coordinating with quantum-focused agencies, pushing PQC adoption, and avoiding a scope-lock obsession with a single adversary. It is a bold step into a quantum future, but the real test lies in translating intent into action amid a still-nascent threat landscape.

Robert Clifford is a CISSP with over 25 years of experience in security-centric envrionments.